1. Introduction
Case Name:
Marke v. Johnson (CIVIL CASE 425 of 1953) 1953 SLSC 2
Court:
Supreme Court of Sierra Leone
Judge:
Boston, Ag. J.
Date of Judgment:
2 December 1953
2. Factual Background
The plaintiff, Mrs. Marke, filed an action against the defendant, Mr. Johnson, to recover damages for slander. According to Mrs. Marke, the defendant accused her of killing his child through fetish practices during a funeral procession. The specific words uttered by Mr. Johnson, in Krio, were: “Taiwo aye: look out of the window; the child whom you killed is being carried away to be buried.” Mrs. Marke claimed that these statements caused serious injury to her character, credit, and reputation, bringing her into public scandal, odium, and contempt.
Mrs. Marke argued that the accusation implied she had committed a criminal offense and that such an imputation was actionable per se, without the need to prove special damages. The defendant, Mr. Johnson, did not appear to defend himself in court.
3. Legal Issues
The case raised several important legal issues:
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Imputation of a Criminal Offense:
- Whether the defendant’s statement accusing Mrs. Marke of killing a child by fetish imputed the commission of a criminal offense under Sierra Leonean law, making the statement actionable per se.
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Slander Actionable Per Se:
- Whether the plaintiff was required to prove special damage, or whether the words spoken were actionable without such proof due to the nature of the alleged offense.
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Interpretation of the Fangay Ordinance:
- Whether the accusation of killing by fetish fell within the scope of the Fangay Ordinance, which criminalizes certain occult practices, and whether such an act was recognized as a criminal offense.
4. The Court’s Analysis
Imputation of a Criminal Offense:
The court examined whether the defendant’s accusation could be considered an imputation of a criminal offense, which would make the words actionable per se. The plaintiff argued that the accusation of killing a child by fetish suggested she had committed a criminal act. However, the court noted that the plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant accused her of murder or manslaughter. Instead, the accusation focused on killing by fetish, a form of witchcraft or supernatural practice.
The court found that while the imputation of a criminal offense may be actionable per se, the words used by the defendant did not imply the commission of a recognized criminal offense under Sierra Leonean law. “In this case, the plaintiff does not say the defendant accused her of murder or manslaughter… her complaint is that the defendant accused her of killing his child by fetish.”
Slander Actionable Per Se:
The court reiterated that slander is actionable per se in certain circumstances, particularly when the words impute the commission of a crime. However, the court found that the plaintiff’s claim did not fall within this category, as the words used by the defendant did not amount to an accusation of a known criminal offense. “The use of such words does not impute the commission of a crime.” Therefore, the plaintiff was required to prove special damage resulting from the slanderous statements, which she failed to do.
Interpretation of the Fangay Ordinance:
The court considered the Fangay Ordinance (Cap. 78), which criminalizes the practice of fangay, defined as using or pretending to use supernatural powers or occult means for fraudulent or unlawful purposes. The court found that the Fangay Ordinance was designed to prevent fraud and extortion by individuals pretending to possess supernatural powers. “The object of the Ordinance is to prevent persons practicing frauds on their credulous victims and extorting money from people by the false pretense of possessing supernatural powers or occult means.” The court concluded that the Fangay Ordinance did not apply to cases of alleged killing by fetish, which would be punishable only as homicide if the elements of such an offense were proven.
Since killing by fetish was not a crime recognized by the law, the court held that the words spoken by the defendant did not impute a criminal offense, and therefore, the plaintiff’s action for slander could not succeed without proof of special damages.
5. Judgment
The court dismissed the plaintiff’s action, holding that the words spoken by the defendant did not impute a criminal offense and were not actionable per se. As the plaintiff had failed to prove special damage, the court had no choice but to dismiss the suit.
“The plaintiff in her claim stated that she has been brought into public scandal, odium, and contempt, but the only witness she called said that he still held her in high regard after hearing the words complained of.”
The court ordered that the costs of the proceedings be paid by the estate.
6. Conclusion
The case of Marke v. Johnson highlights key principles in Sierra Leonean law regarding slander, the imputation of criminal offenses, and the interpretation of laws related to supernatural practices. The ruling emphasizes that while slander is actionable per se when it involves the imputation of a recognized criminal offense, accusations based on supernatural practices, such as killing by fetish, do not meet this criterion. Therefore, plaintiffs must prove special damage unless the words spoken directly accuse the individual of committing a legally recognized crime.
The case also clarifies the scope of the Fangay Ordinance, which criminalizes fraud and extortion through the pretense of supernatural powers but does not encompass killings attributed to fetish practices. The ruling underscores the importance of distinguishing between culturally significant accusations and legally recognized offenses when assessing slander claims.
Keywords
- Slander
- Imputation of a criminal offense
- Fangay Ordinance
- Witchcraft practices
- Special damages in slander
- Sierra Leonean defamation law
- Criminal liability for supernatural practices
- Homicide and manslaughter
Sample Questions on the Case
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What are the conditions under which slander is actionable per se in Sierra Leonean law?
- Slander is actionable per se when the words impute the commission of a recognized criminal offense or fall within other specific categories, such as statements affecting professional reputation. However, words accusing someone of supernatural acts, such as killing by fetish, are not actionable without proof of special damages.
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How did the court interpret the Fangay Ordinance in this case?
- The court interpreted the Fangay Ordinance as a law aimed at preventing fraud and extortion through the pretense of supernatural powers. The ordinance did not cover cases of alleged killing by fetish, which would only be punishable as homicide if the necessary elements of the offense were proven.
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Why did the court dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for slander?
- The court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim because the words spoken by the defendant did not impute a legally recognized criminal offense. Since the plaintiff did not allege or prove special damages, the slander action could not succeed.
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What is the significance of special damage in slander cases?
- Special damage refers to specific harm or loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the slanderous statement. In cases where the words spoken do not fall into a category of slander that is actionable per se, the plaintiff must prove special damage to succeed in their claim.
Application of Principles
The principles established in Marke v. Johnson are important for understanding the legal framework surrounding slander and defamation in Sierra Leone. Legal practitioners handling defamation cases must carefully assess whether the words spoken by the defendant impute a recognized criminal offense or fall within other actionable categories. If not, it is essential to prove special damage to succeed in a slander claim.
This case also provides valuable guidance for interpreting the Fangay Ordinance and other laws related to supernatural practices. Defendants accused of engaging in witchcraft or other occult activities must be aware that such accusations may not constitute criminal offenses unless the elements of fraud or extortion are present. Plaintiffs seeking to pursue defamation claims based on such accusations must be prepared to demonstrate tangible harm resulting from the statements.
The ruling serves as a precedent for future defamation cases in Sierra Leone, ensuring that culturally significant accusations are distinguished from legally actionable offenses.