• Condonation and evidence of forgiveness – a matrimonial offence is condoned where the injured spouse forgives the offending spouse and they cohabit and have sexual intercourse.

• Revival of condoned cruelty – condoned cruelty may be revived by acts of great unkindness; the graver the original offence, the slighter the act needed to revive it. Condonation is subject to an implied condition that the guilty spouse will commit no further matrimonial offence; any further offence cancels the condonation and revives the original cause of complaint.

• Tests for cruelty – cruelty entails conduct causing danger to life, limb or health, or a reasonable apprehension of such danger; kindness in other respects does not prevent conduct from amounting to cruelty.

• Petition and cross‑petition – where both parties have been guilty of matrimonial offences and both contributed to the breakdown of the marriage, the proper decree is a divorce on both the petition and the cross‑petition.

• Maintenance and alimony – a decree dissolving the marriage on a petition that prays for alimony and secured provision may order maintenance for the spouse and children from the date the petition was filed.

Procedural Posture

The petitioner (wife) filed a petition for divorce on grounds of cruelty and sought alimony pendente lite and permanent maintenance for herself and their three children. The respondent (husband) opposed the petition and filed a cross‑petition alleging cruelty by the petitioner. The case was heard in the Supreme Court’s divorce jurisdiction by Cole J (acting as Chief Justice) on 4 January 1967. After considering the evidence and the parties’ submissions, the court delivered a written judgment.

Facts of the Case

• Marriage and personalities – The parties had been married for six years and had three young children. The petitioner was highly strung and sociable; she enjoyed parties and contact with relatives and friends. The respondent’s work and ambitions dominated his life; he disliked parties, worked late hours and insisted that the petitioner stay at home or accompany him if she went out. His possessiveness caused frequent quarrels. When she disagreed or disobeyed him he would sulk or nag, reducing her to tears and sometimes to hysterical behaviour. Her health deteriorated – she suffered nervous strain, depression and psychosomatic symptoms. Although a doctor advised the respondent to humour and indulge his wife, he continued imposing his will.

• Condonation – In June 1966 the petitioner forgave the respondent’s previous cruelty and they resumed cohabitation, including sexual intercourse. This amounted to condonation of prior acts of cruelty.

• July 5 incident – In early July the petitioner discovered an imprint of a love letter the respondent had written to another woman. When she confronted him in his office he admitted writing it but refused to apologise or identify the woman. Upset, she removed her rings and left. That night she insisted on discussing the letter, threw water on him to wake him, flicked her nightdress in his face and attacked him with a broken bottle; he beat her severely. She later slept in a separate room.

• July 9 incident – The petitioner planned to attend a friend’s wedding shower. The respondent, lying in bed, told her that if she went out she should make arrangements to sleep elsewhere and boasted that the police would prevent her re‑entry. He called the Commissioner of Police requesting armed police to guard the house. The petitioner telephoned her parents, slept at their home, and returned the next morning to remove her belongings and the children. She refused to return, fearing she would become a virtual prisoner.

• Subsequent proceedings – Both parties filed for divorce, alleging cruelty. The petitioner sought alimony and maintenance; the respondent sought dissolution of marriage and contested alimony.

Issues for Determination

1. Whether the respondent’s behaviour constituted legal cruelty – i.e., conduct causing danger to life, limb or health or a reasonable apprehension of such danger.

2. Whether the petitioner’s forgiveness and cohabitation in June 1966 condoned the respondent’s prior cruelty.

3. Whether the incidents of 5 July and 9 July 1966 revived the condoned cruelty.

4. Whether the petitioner’s conduct amounted to cruelty towards the respondent, entitling him to relief on the cross‑petition.

5. Appropriate orders – if both parties were guilty of cruelty, what form of decree and what orders for maintenance, custody and costs should be granted.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s submissions

• The petitioner alleged that throughout the marriage the respondent was possessive and domineering, imposing his will on her despite medical advice to treat her gently. His behaviour deteriorated her health, causing nervous breakdowns.

• She argued that she condoned his cruelty in June 1966 by forgiving him and resuming marital relations, but the incidents of 5 July and 9 July 1966 revived that cruelty. The letter to another woman and his callous indifference provoked her anger; his refusal to apologise and subsequent physical violence constituted great unkindness. The incident of 9 July, where he summoned armed police to prevent her leaving or returning, was oppressive and frightened her for her safety. These acts revived the condoned cruelty and entitled her to a decree of divorce.

• She sought alimony pendente lite and permanent maintenance for herself and the children, emphasising that she had no independent means and her health prevented her from working.

Respondent’s submissions

• The respondent denied cruelty and alleged that the petitioner’s social life and disobedience caused quarrels. He contended that the petitioner used violence and foul language, particularly during the night of 5 July when she poured water on him, flicked her nightdress in his face and attacked him with a broken bottle. He insisted that she provoked him and that any force used was in self‑defence.

• He argued that the petitioner condoned any previous cruelty by resuming cohabitation in June 1966 and that her subsequent conduct constituted cruelty towards him. He therefore sought a decree on the cross‑petition and opposed paying maintenance.

Authorities Cited

• Richardson v. Richardson and Beale v. Beale – English divorce cases establishing that condoned cruelty may be revived by subsequent acts of great unkindness, and that the graver the original offence, the slighter the later act required to revive it.

• O’Brien v. O’Brien – authority that where both parties are guilty of matrimonial offences and both contribute to the breakdown of the marriage, the proper decree is a divorce on both the petition and cross‑petition.

• Murray v. Murray (Washington Sup. Ct., 1951) – defines condonation as forgiveness with an implied condition that the injury shall not be repeated; if misconduct recurs, the right to remedy for former injuries revives. This case emphasises that resuming cohabitation may amount to condonation but the burden lies on the party asserting it, and condonation is conditional.

• Collins v. Collins (H.L. (Sc.), 1884) – demonstrates the Scottish law position that condonation of adultery, once given and followed by cohabitation, is an absolute bar to divorce and cannot be conditional. The House of Lords disapproved of the doctrine of revival of condoned adultery; Lord Blackburn held that reconciliation restores the parties to the status of a new marriage.

Decision / Judgment

Findings on cruelty and condonation – Cole J defined legal cruelty as conduct that endangers life, limb or health, or causes a reasonable apprehension of such danger. He found that the respondent habitually imposed his will on the petitioner and persisted in his callous behaviour despite knowing its impact on her health, thereby meeting the legal test for cruelty. He held that forgiveness and resumption of cohabitation in June 1966 amounted to condonation. However, condonation is conditional: it requires genuine repentance and future kindness; any subsequent act of great unkindness revives the condoned cruelty. The court considered the events of 5 July and 9 July to decide whether the respondent revived the condoned cruelty.

Respondent’s callous treatment on 5 July – After discovering the imprint of a love letter to another woman, the petitioner confronted the respondent, who admitted writing it but refused to apologise or pacify her. The judge remarked that there was “not a scintilla of evidence to show that the respondent … tried to pacify the petitioner for something so palpably wrong.” He found this treatment an act of great unkindness that revived the condoned cruelty.

Respondent’s oppressive conduct on 9 July – The judge condemned the respondent’s decision to summon armed police to prevent the petitioner leaving or returning home: he held that this conduct amounted to great unkindness and that the petitioner was justified in leaving the matrimonial home for good.

Ratio Decidendi

1. Condonation as conditional forgiveness – Condonation of cruelty is forgiveness accompanied by resumption of marital relations. It is subject to an implied condition that the offending spouse will commit no further matrimonial offence and will treat the other spouse with conjugal kindness. Once this condition is breached by acts of great unkindness, the condonation is cancelled and the original cruelty is revived.

2. Cruelty defined by danger to health and safety – Conduct that endangers or reasonably causes apprehension for life, limb or health constitutes cruelty. Acts of kindness do not negate the existence of cruelty when the overall conduct is oppressive.

3. Decree on both petition and cross‑petition – Where both spouses are guilty of cruelty and both contribute to the breakdown of the marriage, the proper decree is dissolution of the marriage on both petitions, regardless of which party was more to blame.

Obiter Dictum

Cole J remarked that the law does not require a guilty spouse to make a formal apology, but in circumstances where a spouse is known to be highly strung, a callous refusal to pacify them can amount to great unkindness. He also observed that a spouse confronted with provocation could have avoided physical confrontation by withdrawing from the scene.

Final Orders / Reliefs Granted

1. Decrees – The court dissolved the marriage on both the petition and the cross‑petition.

2. Custody – Custody of the three children was awarded to the petitioner; the respondent was granted reasonable access.

3. Maintenance – The respondent was ordered to pay Le 50 per month to the petitioner and Le 60 per month for the children’s maintenance, effective from 24 August 1966.

4. Costs – The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of both petitions.

5. Liberty to apply – Either party could apply to the court in case of disagreement on custody and access arrangements.

Commentary / Practice Note

Revival of condoned cruelty – comparative perspectives

The Supreme Court’s reasoning underscores that condonation is not an absolute bar to subsequent divorce proceedings; it is conditional forgiveness. The judge relied on English authorities (Richardson v. Richardson, Beale v. Beale) that condoned cruelty may be revived by any later act of great unkindness. This aligns with the American case Murray v. Murray where condonation was defined as forgiveness with an implied condition that the injury shall not be repeated. Both courts require genuine repentance and kind treatment following condonation; recurrence of cruelty reopens the door to divorce.

However, the approach in other jurisdictions differs. In Collins v. Collins the House of Lords held that under Scots law full condonation of adultery followed by cohabitation is unconditional and cannot be revived. Lord Blackburn objected to the English doctrine of revival, reasoning that reconciliation restores the status of marriage and cannot be made more precarious. Thus, while Sierra Leonean and English law treat condonation as conditional, Scottish law views it as a complete remission of the offence. Practitioners should be mindful of these differences in cross‑border matrimonial disputes.

Importance of proportionality in reviving condoned offences

Cole J highlighted that the more serious the original cruelty, the less serious the subsequent act required to revive it. His analysis emphasises the need to consider the cumulative impact of oppressive behaviour. In this case the respondent’s persistent control, refusal to apologise for a suspected affair and the extreme step of summoning armed police were sufficient to revive condoned cruelty. At the same time, the judge recognised that the petitioner’s provocative actions also amounted to cruelty. The court therefore granted decrees to both parties, illustrating the equitable principle that blameworthiness on both sides does not preclude relief but affects ancillary orders.

Maintenance and custody considerations

The judgment affirms that in divorce proceedings where alimony and secured provision are prayed for, the court may order maintenance from the date the petition is filed. The court considered the petitioner’s lack of means, her health, her caretaking duties and the children’s welfare. Practitioners should ensure that pleadings request maintenance from the appropriate date and provide evidence of the financial needs of the spouse and children.

Lessons for legal practitioners

1. Plead condonation and revival clearly – A petition alleging cruelty after condonation should plead the forgiveness and specify the acts said to revive the condoned offence.

2. Gather corroborative evidence – In this case the petitioner relied on letters, medical advice and testimony of the Commissioner of Police. Correspondence and independent witnesses strengthen claims of cruelty and unkindness.

3. Advise clients on behaviour after reconciliation – Clients who have forgiven a spouse should understand that forgiveness is conditional on kind treatment. Any further act of cruelty can reopen past offences; conversely, provocative actions by the injured spouse may support a cross‑petition.

Tags and Categories (for Lanbuk.com indexing)

Categories: Family Law – Divorce; Domestic violence and cruelty; Alimony and maintenance; Child custody.
Tags: condonation, cruelty, revival of condoned offence, great unkindness, cross‑petition, maintenance, alimony, custodial rights, matrimonial offences, social life, possessiveness.

Objective (Multiple‑Choice) Questions

1. In Macaulay v. Macaulay, what legal definition of cruelty did the court apply?

A. Conduct that shocks the conscience but is not necessarily harmful.
B. Conduct causing danger to life, limb or health or a reasonable apprehension of such danger.
C. Any unkind behaviour irrespective of its effects.
D. Continuous adultery with another partner.

2. What act constituted condonation by the petitioner of the respondent’s earlier cruelty?

A. Writing a letter of forgiveness.
B. Resuming cohabitation and sexual intercourse with the respondent.
C. Ignoring the respondent’s conduct.
D. Accepting gifts from the respondent.

3. According to Cole J, what revives condoned cruelty?

A. A mere argument between spouses.
B. Any subsequent matrimonial offence or act of great unkindness.
C. The passage of time.
D. Evidence that the offence was originally serious.

4. Which of the following statements best reflects the court’s approach to petitions and cross‑petitions when both parties are guilty of cruelty?

A. Only the more culpable spouse may obtain a decree.
B. Both petitions must be dismissed.
C. A decree of divorce should be granted on both the petition and the cross‑petition.
D. The court must refuse a decree because divorce is discretionary.

5. What maintenance order did the court make for the petitioner?

A. Le 10 per month for herself and the children.
B. Le 50 per month for herself and Le 60 per month for the children, effective from 24 August 1966.
C. A lump sum of Le 1 000.
D. No maintenance because she condoned the cruelty.

6. Which of the following cases indicates that condonation is conditional forgiveness subject to implied conditions that the injury will not be repeated?

A. Collins v. Collins (H.L. (Sc.), 1884).
B. Murray v. Murray (Wash. Sup. Ct., 1951).
C. Durant v. Durant.
D. Blandford v. Blandford.

7. In the July 9 incident, what action by the respondent was deemed an act of great unkindness?

A. Writing a letter to another woman.
B. Summoning armed police to prevent the petitioner leaving or returning home.
C. Throwing water on the petitioner.
D. Asking his mother to intervene.

8. Why did the court partially uphold the respondent’s cross‑petition?

A. Because the petitioner committed adultery.
B. Because the petitioner provoked and attacked the respondent on 5 July, constituting cruelty.
C. Because she refused to give up socialising.
D. Because she did not maintain the children properly.

9. Which of the following reflects the Scottish law position on condonation as illustrated in Collins v. Collins?

A. Condonation is always conditional and can be revived by any misconduct.
B. Condonation of adultery followed by cohabitation is absolute and cannot be conditional.
C. Condonation has been abolished in Scotland.
D. Only adultery can be condoned, not cruelty.

10. What did the court say about the effect of acts of kindness in assessing cruelty?

A. Kindness prevents any finding of cruelty.
B. Acts of kindness are irrelevant to determining cruelty.
C. There may be cruelty sufficient to ground a divorce although the guilty spouse performs acts of kindness and generosity.
D. Kindness aggravates cruelty.

Answers to Objective Questions

1. B – conduct causing danger to life, limb or health or reasonable apprehension.

2. B – resuming cohabitation and sexual intercourse.

3. B – any subsequent offence or act of great unkindness.

4. C – a decree on both petition and cross‑petition.

5. B – Le 50 per month for the wife and Le 60 per month for the children.

6. B – Murray v. Murray.

7. B – summoning armed police.

8. B – the petitioner’s provocative actions constituted cruelty.

9. B – condonation is absolute under Scots law.

10. C – cruelty may exist despite acts of kindness.

Essay Questions

1. Discuss the legal principles governing condonation and its revival in matrimonial law, using Macaulay v. Macaulay and at least one comparative case from another jurisdiction.

Answer:

Condonation is the forgiveness of a matrimonial offence accompanied by resumption of marital cohabitation. In Macaulay v. Macaulay, Cole J held that condonation is conditional: it implies forgiveness of past cruelty on the condition that no further matrimonial offence is committed and that the guilty spouse treats the other with conjugal kindness. The judge found that the petitioner’s forgiveness and resumption of cohabitation in June 1966 constituted condonation. However, the subsequent acts of July 5 and 9 were acts of great unkindness that revived the condoned cruelty. This reflects the English law approach, as seen in Richardson v. Richardson and Beale v. Beale, where condoned cruelty can be revived by subsequent unkindness.

In Murray v. Murray (Washington Supreme Court, 1951), the court defined condonation as “forgiveness with an implied condition that the injury shall not be repeated, and on breach of this condition the right to a remedy for former injuries revives”. The case emphasises that resumption of normal marital relations usually implies condonation but the burden lies on the party asserting it. Like Macaulay, it recognises that condonation is conditional and revivable.

By contrast, Collins v. Collins (House of Lords, 1884) illustrates the Scottish law position: condonation of adultery followed by cohabitation is a complete remission of injury and an absolute bar to divorce; it cannot be made conditional. Lord Blackburn criticised the English doctrine of revival, arguing that reconciliation restores the marriage status and should not be more precarious than a new marriage. The divergence shows that condonation’s effect depends on jurisdiction. Modern statutory reforms in many countries (e.g., Nigeria’s Matrimonial Causes Act 1970) have replaced condonation with irretrievable breakdown of marriage, but courts still consult these cases when dealing with older petitions.

2. Explain how the court in Macaulay v. Macaulay balanced the parties’ respective conduct and why it granted decrees on both the petition and cross‑petition.

Answer:

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the evidence. It found that the respondent’s persistent possessiveness and refusal to heed medical advice caused serious deterioration of the petitioner’s health and met the legal definition of cruelty. The petitioner forgave and resumed cohabitation in June 1966, which condoned previous cruelty. However, the respondent’s actions on July 5 (refusing to apologise for a letter to another woman) and July 9 (summoning armed police) were “acts of great unkindness” that revived the condoned cruelty. These acts justified the petitioner’s petition.

At the same time, the court acknowledged that the petitioner provoked the July 5 fight by pouring water on the respondent, flicking her nightdress in his face and attacking him with a broken bottle. This conduct was held to constitute cruelty towards the respondent. Although her actions were partly provoked by the respondent’s callousness, the judge noted that she “asked for what she got” and could have avoided the confrontation. Thus, both spouses were guilty of cruelty, albeit the respondent bore greater blame.

Applying O’Brien v. O’Brien, which holds that where both parties are guilty of matrimonial offences the proper decree is divorce on both petitions, the court granted decrees on the petition and cross‑petition. This equitable approach recognises that both parties contributed to the breakdown of the marriage and that neither should be deprived of relief because the other is also guilty.

3. Assess the court’s approach to maintenance in Macaulay v. Macaulay and discuss the factors it considered in determining the award.

Answer:

The court considered maintenance after making the decrees. It noted that the petitioner had no independent means; although trained as a secretary, she had not worked since marriage and her health had deteriorated. She was living with her parents and caring for three young children. The respondent had previously provided her with a car and she still needed transport for the children. The judge concluded that it would be unjust not to award maintenance. He awarded Le 50 per month for the petitioner and Le 60 per month for the children, payable from the date the petition was filed (24 August 1966). This retroactive effect acknowledged that the petitioner’s needs existed from the commencement of proceedings. The court also ordered the respondent to pay costs and granted liberty to apply.

In determining maintenance, the court considered the petitioner’s earning capacity, health, caretaking responsibilities, standard of living during marriage, and the respondent’s financial resources. This holistic approach reflects the principle that maintenance should meet the reasonable needs of the spouse and children while taking into account the payer’s ability to pay.

4. Discuss the implications of Macaulay v. Macaulay for the law of condonation and cruelty in Sierra Leonean matrimonial law. Has the decision been overtaken by statutory reforms?

Answer:

At the time of the decision, Sierra Leone’s matrimonial law largely followed English common law and ecclesiastical principles. Macaulay v. Macaulay affirmed that condonation is conditional and can be revived by subsequent acts of cruelty. It also clarified that the legal test of cruelty requires conduct that endangers life, limb or health or causes reasonable apprehension of such danger. The case emphasises that acts of kindness do not negate cruelty and that both spouses can obtain relief when both are guilty of cruelty. These principles remain relevant when dealing with pre‑Matrimonial Causes Act petitions or interpretations of similar statutory provisions.

However, after the enactment of the Sierra Leone Matrimonial Causes Act 1967 (modelled on the Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Act 1970 and influenced by English reforms), condonation ceased to be a standalone bar to divorce. The Act adopts the “irretrievable breakdown” test and provides that facts such as adultery, desertion and cruelty are evidence of breakdown. Section 32 states that condonation is a factor but does not automatically bar relief. Thus, while Macaulay illustrates the common‑law approach to condonation and cruelty, practitioners must now interpret it in light of statutory reforms. Nevertheless, the case remains instructive on principles of fairness, revival of condoned offences and the court’s discretion in maintenance and custody.

5. Analyse the role of gendered expectations and social dynamics in the court’s assessment of cruelty in Macaulay v. Macaulay. To what extent do these factors influence the outcome?

Answer:

The decision reflects mid‑20th‑century societal expectations. The respondent was portrayed as a possessive husband whose work and ambitions took precedence. He expected his wife to stay at home and disapproved of her social life. The court took into account the petitioner’s temperament—she was “sensitive and highly strung” and needed social interactions. The judge acknowledged that the respondent’s refusal to accommodate her needs and his failure to follow medical advice were central to the cruelty finding. This recognition suggests an evolving judicial understanding of the need for mutual respect and autonomy within marriage.

However, gendered assumptions also influenced the analysis. The petitioner’s provocative conduct—pouring water on the respondent and attacking him—was labelled cruelty, and the judge commented that she “asked for what she got”. While the court condemned the respondent’s unkindness, it appeared to expect the petitioner to exercise restraint despite provocation. The outcome—granting decrees to both parties—reflects a balance between recognising the wife’s right to protection from cruelty and the husband’s grievance over her violent response.

These factors underscore that assessments of cruelty are context‑sensitive and influenced by social norms. Modern courts may place greater emphasis on psychological abuse and controlling behaviour while being less tolerant of physical violence as a reaction to provocation. Contemporary gender‑neutral standards require judging conduct based on its impact on health and safety, irrespective of societal expectations about spouses’ roles.