Kamara v The State (Criminal Appeal No. 5/73) [1973] SLCA 9 – Court of Appeal (8 Nov 1973)

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Catchwords (Headnote Summary)

Criminal law – wounding with intent – definition of “wound” – grievous bodily harm – objective test of intent – Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s.18 – Courts Act 1965 s.58 – appellate review and miscarriage of justice – reduction of sentence.

Procedural Posture

The appellant, Kamara, was tried in the Kenema High Court for wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. After an altercation with the headman in charge of a ferry, Kamara struck the complainant, causing severe injuries to his face and left eye. The jury found him guilty and the trial judge imposed a sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment. Kamara appealed to the Court of Appeal, raising factual complaints and challenging the judge’s directions. The appellate court considered whether there had been a miscarriage of justice and the proper definition of the offence before confirming the conviction but reducing the sentence.

Facts of the Case

• The incident – On 26 April 1972 the complainant, headman of the Manowa ferry, was controlling access to the ferry. When Kamara drove his vehicle towards the pontoon without permission, the complainant instructed him to reverse. Kamara refused, approached the complainant with his hand in his jacket pocket, removed his jacket, and struck the complainant’s faceinvestopedia.com. The complainant fell onto a concrete surface and Kamara continued to strike him until a bystander intervenedinvestopedia.com.

• Medical evidence – Doctors Garber and Ulric Jones examined the complainant. They found a lacerated wound of the left eyeball, a deep lacerated wound on the left cheek below the eye, bruises on both knees, and a penetrating injury to the left eyeballinvestopedia.com. Dr Jones removed the left eyeball to preserve vision in the right eyeinvestopedia.com. Both doctors agreed that the injuries were consistent with an assault using a sharp instrument, although no weapon was seen or produced in evidenceinvestopedia.com.

• Defence statements – Kamara told police that the complainant pushed him into a cement gutter during an argument and that both men fell; he claimed the complainant’s injuries resulted from that fall and denied using a weaponinvestopedia.com. At trial he elected to rely on his police statements and did not testifyinvestopedia.com.

• Trial judge’s directions – The judge instructed the jury that a “wound” included incised, punctured or contused wounds and that the continuity of the skin must be brokeninvestopedia.com. He told the jury they could infer intention if they found Kamara inflicted the injuries and defined “grievous bodily harm” as harm that would “seriously injure” the complainantinvestopedia.com.

• Verdict and sentence – The jury convicted Kamara of wounding with intent, and the judge sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment.

Issues for Determination

1. Whether the complainant’s injuries constituted a “wound” under s.18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.

2. Whether the prosecution proved the requisite intent to cause grievous bodily harm or to resist lawful apprehension.

3. Whether the trial judge misdirected the jury on the law governing “wound,” “grievous bodily harm,” and “intent,” and if so, whether such misdirection caused a miscarriage of justice within section 58 of the Courts Act 1965.

4. Whether the sentence of twelve years’ imprisonment was appropriate.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s submissions

• Kamara argued that he was not guilty, contending that the injuries resulted from the complainant falling into a gutter during a struggle and not from an intentional blowinvestopedia.com.

• He submitted that the alleged weapon was never produced, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was inconsistent, and he had no previous antagonism with the complainantinvestopedia.com.

• He requested a retrial, asserting that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the elements of the offence.

Respondent’s submissions (State)

• Counsel for the State maintained that the medical evidence supported the conclusion that the injuries were inflicted deliberately with a sharp objectinvestopedia.com.

• The State argued that the jury was properly directed to infer intention from Kamara’s voluntary and unlawful actions and that the evidence overwhelmingly supported guilt.

• Any misstatement by the trial judge on the meaning of grievous bodily harm was cured by the strength of the evidence and the operation of section 58 of the Courts Act 1965investopedia.com.

Authorities Cited

• DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290 – The House of Lords held that when a defendant is capable of forming an intention, the question of intent is assessed objectively: the jury must consider what the ordinary reasonable person would have contemplated as the natural and probable result of the defendant’s actlawteacher.net. It also held that “grievous bodily harm” should be given its ordinary and natural meaning, namely “really serious harm”lawteacher.net.

• R v Smith (1837) 8 C. & P. 173 – A blow which broke a victim’s jaw internally but did not break the external skin was held to constitute a wounding; an internal break in the continuity of tissue suffices.

• R v Cohen (1909) 2 Cr App R 197 – Discussed the appellate court’s power to quash a conviction where the trial judge misdirected the jury unless a correct direction would inevitably have produced the same verdict. Channell J. explained that if the only reasonable verdict on a proper direction would be guilty, the conviction should standinvestopedia.com.

• R v Haddy [1944] KB 442 – Reaffirmed that appellate courts may dismiss an appeal notwithstanding a misdirection if there is no substantial miscarriage of justiceinvestopedia.com.

• R v Smith (1837) 8 C. & P. 173; Glaister, Medical Jurisprudence & Toxicology (8th ed., 1945) – Provided definitions of a wound: any external or internal lesion resulting from the application of violenceinvestopedia.com.

Decision / Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal but reduced the sentence from twelve to seven years’ imprisonment. Tejan J.A., delivering the judgment of the court, held:

1. Definition of “wound” – The court criticised the trial judge’s initial definition, noting that it described “maim” rather than “wound”investopedia.com. Referring to R v Smith and medical authorities, the court held that a wound includes any break in the continuity of tissues, whether external or internalinvestopedia.com. The lacerated cheek and penetrating eye injury were therefore wounds within the statute.

2. Intent to cause grievous bodily harm – The court stated that a jury should consider whether the accused’s unlawful and voluntary act, clearly aimed at the complainant, was of such a kind that grievous bodily harm was the natural and probable consequenceinvestopedia.com. Citing DPP v Smith, the court emphasised that proof of actual foresight is unnecessary; the test is what an ordinary responsible person would foreseeinvestopedia.com. Having excluded accident, the court held that Kamara ought to have foreseen that striking a blow to the complainant’s face with an implement would likely cause serious injury, and his intent could be inferredinvestopedia.com.

3. Meaning of “grievous bodily harm” – The court held that the trial judge’s direction that grievous bodily harm meant harm that would “seriously injure” the complainant was inaccurate. The expression should be given its ordinary and natural meaning of “really serious bodily harm” as stated in DPP v Smithlawteacher.net.

4. Misdirection and s.58 of the Courts Act 1965 – Although the trial judge’s directions on wound, intent and grievous bodily harm were not wholly satisfactory, the appellate court applied section 58(2) of the Courts Act. Following R v Cohen, it held that a conviction should not be quashed if, on a correct direction, the only reasonable and proper verdict would still be one of guiltyinvestopedia.com. In view of the overwhelming evidence, the court concluded that no substantial miscarriage of justice occurred and dismissed the appealinvestopedia.com.

5. Sentence – The Court considered that although the offence was serious, Kamara had no previous convictions. It reduced the sentence to seven years’ imprisonment, which it considered sufficient deterrenceinvestopedia.com.

Key Quotations from Judgment

• Wound defined: “All lesions of the body, external or internal, caused by the application of violence may be designated as wounds. … A wound is therefore a solution of continuity of any of the tissues of the body”investopedia.com (citing Glaister and R v Smith).

• Objective test of intent: The court highlighted that “the only test available” for determining whether grievous bodily harm was the natural and probable result is what the ordinary responsible man would, in all the circumstances, have contemplatedinvestopedia.com (relying on DPP v Smith).

• Definition of grievous bodily harm: The expression should be given its ordinary and natural meaning; “grievous” means “really serious”lawteacher.net.

Ratio Decidendi

1. Objective assessment of intent: In offences of wounding with intent, the accused is taken to intend the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary and unlawful act. Proof of actual foresight is unnecessary; the test is what a reasonable person would foreseeinvestopedia.com.

2. Wound encompasses internal and external injuries: For s.18, a wound means any break in the continuity of the body’s tissues, internal or external. An injury to the eyeball and a deep laceration of the cheek fall within this definitioninvestopedia.com.

3. Grievous bodily harm means “really serious bodily harm”: The words “grievous bodily harm” carry their plain meaning and should not be further defined for the jurylawteacher.net.

4. Misstatement not fatal if no substantial miscarriage: Under s.58(2) of the Courts Act 1965, an appellate court may uphold a conviction despite misdirection if, on a proper direction, the only reasonable verdict would be one of guiltyinvestopedia.com.

Obiter Dictum

• The court opined that the trial judge’s explanation of “wound” as an injury reducing a person’s ability to fight was really a definition of maim, not wound, and should not be repeated in future chargesinvestopedia.com.

Final Orders / Relief Granted

• Appeal dismissed – Conviction for wounding with intent affirmed.

• Sentence varied – Sentence reduced from twelve years to seven years’ imprisonment, effective from the original date of sentencinginvestopedia.com.

Commentary / Practice Note

This case illustrates the Sierra Leone Court of Appeal’s adoption of the objective test for intent set out in DPP v Smith. The court emphasised that intent can be inferred if a reasonable person would foresee serious injury as a natural and probable consequence of the accused’s voluntary act. The decision aligns with English authority and demonstrates that Sierra Leone courts look to UK case law when interpreting the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. In particular, the court endorsed Lord Chancellor Kilmuir’s statement that juries should apply an objective standard and that actual intention is immaterial where the accused is capable of forming intentlawteacher.net.

The judgment also reaffirms that “grievous bodily harm” should be given its ordinary meaning of “really serious harm”, echoing the Law Commission’s view that judges should not attempt to define the term furtherlawteacher.net. This approach is consistent with later authorities such as R v Brown and Stratton, where the Court of Appeal held that the term is wholly objective and should not be elaboratedlawteacher.net. Conversely, the requirement that a wound involves a break in the external skin has been refined in cases like JJC v Eisenhower, which defined wounding as the breaking of both layers of skin; internal bleeding without external break does not sufficelawteacher.net. These distinctions are important for practitioners assessing whether to charge under s.18 or s.20 OAPA.

For Sierra Leonean practitioners, this case is a reminder that section 58 of the Courts Act 1965 (mirroring s.4 of the UK Criminal Appeal Act 1907) allows the appellate court to uphold convictions where misdirection did not occasion a substantial miscarriage of justice. The Court of Appeal will examine whether, on a correct direction, the jury could have returned a different verdict. Only if there was a real possibility of acquittal will the conviction be quashedinvestopedia.com. This principle was similarly applied in Habib v Attorney‑General, where the court refused relief due to illegality despite defects in the trial. Accordingly, counsel on appeal must show not only misdirection but also that the error may have affected the outcome.

Multiple‑Choice Questions

1. In Kamara v The State, what was the relationship between Kamara and the complainant at the time of the offence?
   A. Kamara was a ferryman employed by the complainant.
   B. The complainant was headman controlling access to the ferry and Kamara was a driver trying to board.
   C. Kamara and the complainant were co‑workers operating the ferry.
   D. They were neighbours involved in a land dispute.

2. Which statement best describes the Court of Appeal’s definition of a “wound” for the purposes of s.18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861?
   A. An injury that reduces a person’s ability to defend himself.
   B. Any lesion of the body caused by violence, whether external or internal, involving a break in the continuity of tissues.
   C. Only injuries that penetrate the skin externally.
   D. Injuries that cause lasting disfigurement.

3. Regarding intent, what test did the Court of Appeal apply to determine whether Kamara intended to cause grievous bodily harm?
   A. Whether Kamara actually foresaw the injury he caused.
   B. Whether a reasonable person would have contemplated grievous bodily harm as the natural and probable consequence of the act.
   C. Whether Kamara expressed regret after the incident.
   D. Whether the victim sustained permanent disability.

4. According to the court, how should “grievous bodily harm” be explained to a jury?
   A. As harm that seriously injures the body.
   B. As harm that causes emotional trauma.
   C. Using its ordinary and natural meaning, namely “really serious bodily harm.”
   D. By listing specific injuries such as broken bones and disfigurement.

5. Under section 58 of the Courts Act 1965, the Court of Appeal may dismiss an appeal despite misdirection if:
   A. The trial judge misdirected on a point of law.
   B. The jury asked questions during deliberations.
   C. There is no substantial miscarriage of justice and a correct direction would still have led to a guilty verdict.
   D. The conviction relates to offences against the person only.

6. Which of the following authorities did the Court of Appeal rely on to support the objective test for intent?
   A. R v Brown and Stratton [1988]
   B. DPP v Smith [1961]
   C. JJC v Eisenhower [1984]
   D. Habib v Attorney‑General

7. In what way did the trial judge err when directing the jury on “grievous bodily harm”?
   A. He told the jury to interpret the term based on the complainant’s subjective perception of pain.
   B. He defined the term as harm that would seriously injure the complainant’s body rather than using the ordinary meaning of “really serious harm.”
   C. He said grievous bodily harm required permanent disfigurement.
   D. He gave no direction at all on grievous bodily harm.

8. What factor allowed the Court of Appeal to reduce Kamara’s sentence from twelve to seven years’ imprisonment?
   A. Evidence that the complainant provoked the attack.
   B. The absence of any previous convictions against Kamara.
   C. The presence of extenuating medical circumstances.
   D. A recommendation from the trial judge.

9. Which principle from R v Cohen did the Court of Appeal apply?
   A. That appellate courts must quash a conviction whenever any misdirection occurs.
   B. That a conviction should stand if a correct direction would have produced the same verdict and no substantial miscarriage of justice occurred.
   C. That any misdirection on fact constitutes a miscarriage of justice.
   D. That appellate courts may order a retrial whenever new evidence emerges.

10. What was Kamara’s principal defence at trial?
    A. That he acted in self‑defence using reasonable force.
    B. That the complainant’s injuries occurred accidentally when they both fell into a gutter during a struggle.
    C. That the complainant assaulted him first with a knife.
    D. That he was insane at the time of the offence.

Answers: 1–B; 2–B; 3–B; 4–C; 5–C; 6–B; 7–B; 8–B; 9–B; 10–B

Essay Questions and Answers

1. Discuss the legal definition of a “wound” under s.18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and explain how the Court of Appeal applied that definition in Kamara v The State.

Answer: A “wound” under s.18 requires a break in the continuity of tissues of the body caused by the application of violence; it can be internal or external. In R v Smith (1837), a blow that fractured a jaw internally without breaking the external skin was held to constitute a wound. Medical jurisprudence defines a wound as “a solution of continuity of any tissue of the body caused by injury”investopedia.com. In Kamara v The State, the complainant suffered a lacerated eye‑ball, a deep lacerated wound on the cheek and bruises. The Court of Appeal criticised the trial judge’s initial definition (which equated wounding with maiming), but, relying on medical evidence and R v Smith, it concluded that the injuries were wounds within the statuteinvestopedia.com. Even if the eyeball is viewed as an internal organ, the injury constituted a wound because it broke tissue continuityinvestopedia.com. Thus, the court reaffirmed that the presence of an internal break suffices and clarified the meaning of a wound for future cases.

2. Evaluate the role of the objective test for intent in offences of wounding with intent, citing authorities referred to in Kamara v The State.

Answer: The objective test for intent originates from DPP v Smith [1961]. The House of Lords held that when a defendant is capable of forming intent, the question is whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would have contemplated grievous bodily harm as a natural and probable result of the defendant’s actlawteacher.net. Actual foresight is immaterial. In Kamara v The State, the Court of Appeal endorsed this test, stating that once the jury excludes accident and finds that the act was voluntary and unlawful, they must consider whether grievous bodily harm was the natural and probable consequence of the actinvestopedia.com. The court quoted Holmes J.’s observation that the standard is the prudent man’s foresightinvestopedia.com. Applying this test, it inferred intent from Kamara’s act of striking the complainant’s face with an implement, reasoning that a prudent person would foresee serious injuryinvestopedia.com. The case illustrates that Sierra Leonean courts follow the objective standard, aligning with English criminal law and emphasising foreseeability rather than subjective intention.

3. How did the Court of Appeal in Kamara v The State apply section 58 of the Courts Act 1965 when considering alleged misdirections in the trial judge’s summing‑up?

Answer: Section 58(1) of the Courts Act requires the Court of Appeal to quash a conviction if it finds the verdict unreasonable, unsupported by evidence, or based on a wrong decision of law or fact. Sub‑section (2) allows the court to dismiss an appeal notwithstanding that a point might be decided in favour of the appellant if no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred. The court adopted the approach from R v Cohen, which held that an appeal should be allowed when a misdirection may reasonably have led to a different verdict, but not when the evidence is so overwhelming that only a guilty verdict is possibleinvestopedia.com. In Kamara v The State, the Court acknowledged imperfections in the trial judge’s directions on wound, intent and grievous bodily harm, but, after reviewing the evidence, it concluded that a correct direction would still have resulted in convictioninvestopedia.com. Therefore, applying s.58(2), it dismissed the appeal but reduced the sentence. This demonstrates that appellate courts in Sierra Leone may uphold convictions despite errors in the summing‑up if no substantial injustice is shown.

4. Compare the Court of Appeal’s treatment of “grievous bodily harm” in Kamara v The State with the guidance offered in R v Brown and Stratton and statutory guidance on non‑fatal offences.

Answer: In Kamara v The State, the Court held that “grievous bodily harm” should be given its ordinary and natural meaning of “really serious bodily harm”lawteacher.net and criticised the trial judge for equating it merely with serious injury. The LawTeacher lecture notes explain that R v Brown and Stratton [1988] Crim LR 484 confirmed this approach and stated that judges should not attempt to define grievous bodily harm further for the jurylawteacher.net. The guidance emphasises that the assessment is wholly objective and that permanence is not a prerequisite for GBHlawteacher.net. Moreover, the Crown Prosecution Service’s charging standards provide examples of injuries that may amount to GBH, such as substantial loss of blood and permanent sensory losslawteacher.net. By adhering to the ordinary meaning and avoiding elaborate definitions, the Court of Appeal ensured consistency with modern English authority and highlighted the need to evaluate the severity of harm in context. This approach preserves the flexibility of the jury to decide whether harm is “really serious” on a case‑by‑case basis.

5. Discuss the significance of the reduction of sentence in Kamara v The State and the factors the Court of Appeal considered when exercising its sentencing discretion.

Answer: Although Kamara did not appeal his sentence, the Court of Appeal considered the gravity of the offence and the absence of previous convictionsinvestopedia.com. The offence of wounding with intent is serious and generally attracts heavy sentences to deter violence; however, the court noted that Kamara was not a member of the professional criminal class and that there were no prior convictions. It therefore substituted a sentence of seven years’ imprisonment for the twelve‑year term imposed by the trial judgeinvestopedia.com. This reduction reflects the appellate court’s discretion to adjust punishment to ensure proportionality and fairness while maintaining deterrence. It also signals to sentencing judges the importance of considering personal mitigation and the context of the offence when imposing lengthy custodial terms. In practice, counsel should adduce evidence of good character and other mitigating factors at trial to influence sentencing, and appellants should raise sentencing issues on appeal when appropriate.

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