![Guaranty Trust Bank (SL) Ltd v International Procurement and Construction Services Company & Ors (FTCC 045/22) [2024] SLHCFTCAD 10](https://lanbuk.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/unnamedww.jpg)
Jurisdiction: Sierra Leone (common law jurisdiction)
Court: High Court of Sierra Leone, Commercial and Admiralty Division
Presiding Judge: Hon. Mrs Justice Fatmatta Bintu Alhadi, JA
Date of Ruling: 18 December 2024
Case Number: FTCC.045/22 (2022), G. No. 10
Neutral Citation: [2024] SLHCFTCAD 10
Legal Area(s): Civil Procedure (recusal, bias, fair hearing); Constitutional and Administrative Law (natural justice, judicial impartiality); Professional Ethics and Judicial Conduct
Tags: recusal; bias; apparent bias; presumption of impartiality; former employment; reasonable observer; double reasonableness test; natural justice
Legal Areas
Civil procedure, recusal of judge, allegation of bias, appearance of bias, prior employment relationship with a litigant, alleged affinity with counsel, presumption of judicial impartiality, burden of proof, requirement for hard facts and cogent evidence, reasonable apprehension of bias, real danger of bias, double reasonableness test, refusal of recusal application.
Style of Cause
Between:
Guaranty Trust Bank (SL) Limited … Plaintiff, 1st Respondent
And
International Procurement and Construction Services Company … 1st Defendant, Applicant
Mohamed Hijazi … 2nd Defendant, Applicant
Fayad Hijazy … 3rd Defendant, 2nd Respondent
Counsel:
Mrs F. Sorie for the Plaintiff, 1st Respondent
C.F. Margai Esq for the 1st and 2nd Defendants, Applicants
N.D. Alhadi Esq for the 3rd Defendant, 2nd Respondent
Procedural Posture
This ruling arose in the course of an ongoing commercial action. The 1st and 2nd defendants made an oral application for the trial judge to recuse herself.
The action itself was commenced by writ filed 4 May 2022 in the Commercial and Admiralty Division. The case went for arbitration under the Commercial Court Rules 2022, but arbitration failed. Proceedings in court commenced on 30 March 2023. The matter experienced procedural delays connected with missing processes in the court file and adjournments sought by counsel.
A defendant’s application to strike out the action, supported by affidavit sworn 29 November 2022, was argued on 8 June 2023 and refused by ruling delivered 9 October 2023, with directions for trial.
Trial commenced 6 March 2024. The recusal issue was first raised with the judge on 15 April 2024, and the court directed that submissions be made in open court. The ruling on the recusal application was delivered on 18 December 2024.
Reliefs in the Substantive Action
The plaintiff’s writ (4 May 2022) sought:
Immediate recovery of Le 6,561,432,480.96 (old leones) as the amount by which the defendants’ account stood overdrawn as at 2 March 2022.
Interest at the default rate of 37 percent per annum.
Further or other relief.
Costs.
Facts Relevant to the Recusal Application
The recusal application was premised on two allegations:
That the trial judge previously worked in the legal department of the plaintiff bank.
That counsel for the 3rd defendant had a close affinity with the judge.
Counsel for the 1st and 2nd defendants stated that the 2nd defendant’s son, who had been involved in representation of the 1st defendant through the trial, had informed him of the perceived connection.
Critically, counsel for the applicants also stated that he had no doubt about the judge’s integrity and impartiality and believed she would give a fair trial based on the evidence.
Counsel for the plaintiff opposed the application, asserting that any former relationship ended long ago and would not affect the integrity of the proceedings. Counsel for the 3rd defendant supported the court addressing the issue so it would not arise later as an appeal ground.
Issues for Determination
What is the applicable legal test for judicial recusal in Sierra Leone, including the test for actual bias and apparent bias?
Did the applicants adduce hard facts and cogent evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of judicial impartiality?
Do prior employment background or perceived affinity with counsel, without more, justify recusal?
Arguments of the Parties
Applicants (1st and 2nd Defendants)
The applicants sought recusal based on perceived concern that the judge had previously worked in the legal department of the plaintiff bank.
They alleged a further concern that counsel for the 3rd defendant had a close affinity with the judge.
The applicants provided no details beyond these assertions.
Counsel nevertheless stated his confidence in the judge’s impartiality.
1st Respondent (Plaintiff)
The plaintiff resisted recusal.
Counsel argued that the former relationship, if any, ended a long time ago and would not compromise the proceedings.
Counsel stressed the practical impact on the justice system if judges were required to recuse themselves in all matters involving former employers.
2nd Respondent (3rd Defendant)
Counsel expressed confidence in the integrity of the court.
Counsel supported the issue being addressed and recorded to avoid it being raised later.
Authorities Cited
The ruling referenced:
Black’s Law Dictionary (definition of recusal).
Okpaluba and Maloka, “The Fundamental Principles of Recusal of a Judge at Common Law: Recent Developments”, Obiter vol 43 no 2 (2022).
Zukerman on Civil Procedure (2006).
Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (6th ed, 2012).
R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy (1924) 1 KB.
R v Gough (as cited in the ruling).
Locobail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd (as cited: Locobail v Bayfield Properties (2000) All ER 1).
Decision / Judgment
Held: The application for the trial judge to recuse herself was refused.
Legal Reasoning
(1) The legal basis for recusal
The court anchored recusal in the common law principles of natural justice, including the rule that a person should not be a judge in their own cause, and the broader constitutional requirement of judicial impartiality.
The court emphasised that recusal is not triggered by mere suspicion. The party seeking recusal must rebut the presumption of impartiality with hard facts and cogent evidence showing actual bias, or a reasonable apprehension of bias, assessed objectively.
(2) The objective test, real danger and double reasonableness
Drawing from the cited literature and authorities, the court described an objective assessment from the perspective of a reasonable observer fully apprised of the facts. The court treated the thresholds as high and applied a two stage objective inquiry:
how a reasonable observer would view the judge’s role on the facts, and
whether that observer would reasonably perceive a vested interest or real danger of bias.
(3) Former employment and social or professional background
The court adopted the principle that objections cannot be soundly based on a judge’s social, educational, service or employment background, absent additional facts giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The judge accepted that she had previously worked as manager of the legal department and company secretary of the plaintiff bank, but stated this was about ten years earlier. She further stated that she did not sign any of the bank documents before the court and did not receive any pecuniary advantage from the bank.
(4) Alleged affinity with counsel
The court treated the allegation of affinity with counsel as insufficient, especially in a small society where relationships are common. The court rejected the notion that such an allegation, without supporting facts, could justify recusal.
(5) Absence of evidence and the applicants’ own concessions
The court found that the applicants adduced no evidence showing actual bias, reasonable apprehension of bias, self interest, direct pecuniary interest, or any real danger of bias. The applicants’ own counsel had repeatedly affirmed his belief in the judge’s fairness and integrity.
Accordingly, the presumption of impartiality was not rebutted.
Key Quotations from the Ruling
“It is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”
“An objection based on a judge’s social, service or employment background or that of his or her family cannot form the basis of an objection.”
The court held that the applicants had not supported the objection “with hard facts”, describing the assertions as “whimsical allegations and just suspicion”.
Ratio Decidendi
A judge will not be recused from a case merely because of prior employment history with a party or alleged affinity with counsel. The applicant must rebut the presumption of impartiality by adducing hard facts and cogent evidence establishing actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias, assessed objectively from the standpoint of a reasonable observer fully apprised of the facts. Where no such evidence is adduced, and the allegations rest on suspicion, the recusal application must be refused.
Obiter Dicta
The ruling contains policy observations on the practical consequences of indiscriminate recusal in a small legal system, including the risk of delay and disruption.
The court warned against creating a slippery and dangerous trend of recusal applications grounded in vague associations rather than evidence.
Final Orders / Reliefs Granted
The application for recusal of the trial judge was refused.
Commentary / Practice Note
(1) Evidence standards in recusal applications
This ruling reaffirms that recusal is evidence driven. Applicants must show more than a perceived connection. They must identify facts demonstrating either:
actual bias, or
apparent bias meeting the objective reasonable observer test.
In practical terms, that requires specificity. For example, evidence that a judge was involved in the very transaction in dispute, or has a continuing pecuniary interest, or has made statements suggesting partiality. Vague impressions, gossip, or undisclosed suspicions are insufficient.
(2) Former employment and the modern approach
The ruling aligns with the principle that prior employment, without more, does not automatically disqualify a judge. The key question is whether the prior connection creates a real and reasonable risk of bias in the particular proceedings.
(3) Litigation strategy and professional responsibility
The case is also a caution to counsel. Recusal applications should not be made lightly. Where counsel professes confidence in the judge’s integrity but advances unsubstantiated allegations, the application risks appearing tactical and may attract judicial criticism.
Table of Authorities and Other Laws Referred To
A. Cases
R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy (1924) 1 KB.
R v Gough (as cited in the ruling).
Locobail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd (2000), as cited.
B. Books, articles, and other materials
Black’s Law Dictionary, definition of recusal.
Zukerman on Civil Procedure (2006).
Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (6th ed, 2012).
Okpaluba and Maloka, “The Fundamental Principles of Recusal of a Judge at Common Law: Recent Developments”, Obiter vol 43 no 2 (2022).
C. Rules and procedural instruments
Commercial Court Rules 2022 (arbitration requirement, as mentioned).
Tags and Categories
Categories: Civil Procedure, Judicial Conduct, Natural Justice
Tags: recusal; bias; apparent bias; presumption of impartiality; reasonable observer; former employer; judicial discretion; fair hearing
Sample Legal Questions
Multiple Choice Questions
What was the subject of the ruling in this case?
A. Summary judgment on the bank’s overdraft claim
B. Recusal of the trial judge for alleged bias
C. An application for leave to appeal
D. A contempt application
Which party made the recusal application?
A. The plaintiff bank
B. The 3rd defendant only
C. The 1st and 2nd defendants
D. The court registrar
Which statement best captures the court’s approach to recusal?
A. Prior employment with a party automatically disqualifies a judge
B. Recusal is granted whenever a party expresses discomfort
C. The presumption of impartiality must be rebutted with hard facts and cogent evidence
D. Recusal depends on the subjective feelings of the applicant
Which authority was cited for the principle that justice must be seen to be done?
A. Donoghue v Stevenson
B. R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy
C. Hadley v Baxendale
D. Salomon v Salomon
The court refused recusal mainly because:
A. The case had already gone to arbitration
B. The defendants failed to file pleadings
C. No evidence was adduced showing actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias
D. The plaintiff consented to discontinuance
Multiple Choice Answers
B
C
C
B
C
Essay Questions
Explain the legal test for recusal on the ground of apparent bias and apply it to the facts of this ruling.
Discuss the policy reasons why courts resist recusal applications grounded solely in former employment relationships.
Evaluate how the presumption of impartiality operates and what kind of evidence is necessary to rebut it.